Abstracts of American Decisions by Editors,
RICE vs. RUDDIMAN.
with it. Certainly no one can occupy for his individual purposes
the water front of such riparian -proprietor, and the attempt of any
person to do so would be a trespass. When, therefore, Ruddiman
erected the structure in controversy in the shallow water of the
lake, and upon his water front, it was substantially an erection
upon his own land, and its use and ownership was deliendent upon
his ownership of the land to which it -was appurtenant. He made
it a part of his real estate as much as if it had been an additional
story erected upon a building situated upon the soil not covered
with water. It was a part of the land; appurtenant to it, and to
be enjoyed with it. This he cannot deny; nor can any *ae ques-
tion it whose soil or possession was not thereby invaded. As
between individuals, a wharf and the structures upon it attached
to the soil of a riparian proprietor, are as much a part of the real
estate as is a building erected upon the land over which the 'Water
does not flow; and by a sale of the land they are conveyed. There
is no analogy between such title and the right of fishery, and no
argument can be drawn from the one to support the other. Each
depends upon separate principles of the law.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 1
Legacies, Vested and Contingent.-If it be doubtful whether a legacy
bequeathed by will is vested or contingent, the law inclines to treat it as
vested; and where it is evident from the will, that the testafor intended
to make an entire disposition of his estate, which intention would be
defeated if a legacy given were not vested, it is' an influential considera-
tion that the legacy be construed as vested: Burd's Ex utor vs. Burd's
Administrator.
A legacy is to be deemed vested or contingent, as -the time appears to
have been annexed to the gift or to the payment of it; if'there be a
1 FxomRobert E. Wright, Esq., State Reporter, to be reported in the 4th volume
of his Reports.
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separate and antecedent gift, which is independent of the direction and
time of payment, the legacy is vested: if not, it is contingent: Id.
A testator gave to his brother a life interest in the residue of his per-
sonal estate, and provided, that "at the death of my brother J., I hereby
give and bequeath to my nephew E., son of the said J., two thousand
dollars," &c. E., the nephew and legatee, died before his father J., and
after the death of both, the legacy was claimed by the representatives of
each from the executor, and no provision was made against the lapse of
the legacy, in case the legatee died before the testator. Held, that the
bequest must be construed as reading "It is my will, and I hereby give
to my fie hew E., at the death of my brother," &c., and that this, taken
in connection with the antecedent life interest granted by the testator to
hls brother, would make the legacy vested, which as such, the adminis-
trator of E., the legatee, was entitled to recover: Id.
Bills of Exchange-Rights of Drawee who discounts Bill before Matu-
rity.-The acceptor of a bill being the principal debtor, while the drawer
and indorser are but sureties, payment by the former extinguishes the
debt, leaving no right of action against the latter except when the accept-
ance was supra protest: Swope et al. vs. Ross et al.
The acceptance of a bill is an engagement to pay it according to tenor
and effect at maturity, and not before; and a bill is only "paid" when it
is done in due course and with an intention to discharge it: Id.
The drawee of a bill may accept or pay it supra protest for the honor
of the drawer or indorser, but if he discount it before maturity he stands
in the position of an indorsee as against all prior parties: Id.
The discounting of a bill by the drawee, who has not accepted it, is
neither "payment" nor a promise to pay according to tenor and effect, but
puts him in the position of an indorsee for value, with right of action
against drawer and endorser: Id.
Assignment by a Bank for Benefit of Creditors-Right of Itdorser to
pay .rote discounted by it, in its own depreciated Paper, after a bond fide
Transfer to Assignee.-The indorser of a negotiable note, discounted by a
bank and by it transferred to assignees before maturity, for full value, has
no right, when payment is demanded by the holders, to pay the note in
the depreciated paper of the bank after it has failed: Housum vs. Rogers
.et al.
The Bank of Pennsylvania, through a branch office, discounted a note
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upon the credit of an accommodation indorser, which before it cam, due,
was with other notes transferred by the bank to certain trustees of other
banks, in consideration of a sum of money advanced by them to sustain
its credit: before maturity, the bank failed, but the note was renewed in
the hands of the trustees by the parties to it; when due, payment was
tendered in the notes of the bank by the indorser to the agent of the
trustees, which was refused and suit brought against him upon the note.
Held, that the plaintiffs were holders for value, and could not be required
to receive in payment the depreciated notes of the bank: Id.
Though the transfer of the note by the bank was not in the usual
course of business, it is not for that reason invalid; and where the trans-
action was honest, for the benefit of the public and the protection of the
stockholders, the legal and equitable title in the note would pass to the
trustees, who were entitled to demand payment in constitutional currency
or its equivalent: Id.
Where the note was transferred for value, and, with knowledge of the
transfer and the failure of the bank, the indorser joined the drawers in
renewing the note in the hands of the assignees, he cannot call in question
the power of the bank to transfer the note under the charter, for he was
a debtor and not a creditor interekted in the assets of the bank, and, as
such, entitled to interfere: Id.
Injunction to restrain Creditor of Husband from selling Wife's Real
Estate on Execution.-Under the Act of 11th April 1848 and 12th April
1850, the levy and sale of a wife's real estate by a creditor of her hus-
band's, on execution against him, is contrary to law and may be restrained
by injunction: Runter's Appeal.
In order to authorize the interference of a court of equity, a clear case
of title in the wife under the Acts of 1848 and 1850, must be made out;
otherwise the court will not interfere, but leave the parties to their remedy
at law: Id.
Where the real estate of a wife was levied on by a creditor of her
husband's, and was about to be sold, it was error in the court to dismiss a
bill filed by her, for a preliminary injunction to restrain the execution-
creditor from- selling it: Id.
Parol Title to Land, Evidence in support of-Possession, when Notice
to Lien- Creditors and subsequent Purclhasers.-The owner of a lot of land,
sold a part of it by parol to a borough corporation in 1841, received the
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purchase-money, delivered possession, and the same year the borough
erected a fire-engine house thereon; no deed was executed by the grantor
and his wife until December 1842; before this, on the 6th September
1842, a judgment was entered against the grantor, upon which execution
issued, and the whole lot, including the portion bought by the borough,
was sold by the sheriff to the plaintiff in the judgment, who brought
ejectment and sought upon the trial to restrict the corporation from giving
evidence of title prior to their deed. Held, that the defendants could
show the commencement of their title under the parol purchase, from the
date of their possession, which was in itself notice of their title, when
brought to the knowledge of the plaintiff: Patton. vs. te Borough of
Hollidaysburg.
Though the deed of record is of later date than the purchase, it is not
an inconsistent title with that shown by the parol contract accompanied
with possession in the grantees; it was evidence of the consummation of
the sale, and, as though it were the perfecting act of a written agreement
of sale, the grantee can show the commencement of his title from the date
of his possession: Id.
The corporation defendant was not estopped as against the plaintiff from
showing an earlier inceptive title than the deed, for the plaintiff had
undisputed notice of possession in the borough from' the time it was taken;
therefore lie was not misled by the deed, and hence is not in the position
to claim the exclusion of the truth, which is the effect of an estoppel, lest
it might injure him. Having notice or the means of notice, that the
defendant's title was complete in equity before the entry of his judgment
against the grantor, he cannot claim to have been misled by the deed: Id.
.Mortgage in Trust for Married Woman's Separate Estate, not extin-
guished by Conveyance to her of the Property mortgaged without Consent
of her Trustee; nor by a. Transfer as Collateral Security for Precedent
Debt of Husband without her Consent.-A. being largely indebted to his
wife for moneys received out of her separate estate, gave -a mortgage on-
his own real estate for the balance then due, to a trustee in trust for her.
Three days after, he gave a judgment to his partner B. to secure him.
Afterwards A. and wife conveyed the mortgaged premises for a certain
sum, subject to the mortgage in express terms to C., who soon after recon-
veyed to the wife on the same terms. The wife then joined with her
husband in a mortgage to H., to secure him for money loaned to the hus-
band. At the same time H. procured an assignment of the wife's mort-
gage from her trustee as collateral, and also a release from B. of the
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priority of his lien. The real estate was then sold under the trustee's
mortgage, and the proceeds were ruled into court and claimed by the
wife, on the ground that the mortgage in trust for her still subsisted.
Reid,
That the conveyance of the mortgaged premises to the wife did not
extinguish the mortgage held in trust for her, because her trustee was
not a party to it, the intent to keep the mortgage alive appeared upon the
face of the conveyance, it was for her interest in order to prevent subse-
quent liens from coming in before her, and because all parties acted upon
the idea, and treated- the mortgage as if it was subsisting:- Hatz's AppeaZ
That the mortgage to H. executed by A. and wife was of their estate,
subject to the trust mortgage in her favor, and that the assignment by the
trustee to H., as collateral security for a precedent debt of the husband's,
without the assent of the cestui pw trust, did not pass any interest in
that mortgage to the assignee: Id.
That though the wife, one of the mortgagors, was in equity the owner
of the first mortgage, the subsequent mortgage by herself and husband to
H., after she became the owner of the land, would not postpone in his
favor the lien of the trustee's mortgage, nor estop her from'claiming the
money in satisfaction of that lien; else more force would be given to her
acts by indirection than the law would give, if done directly to that end,
for without the assent and co-operation of the trustee, she could not trans-
fer nor release it; nor if there were no trustee, could she do this, without
the joinder" of her husband: Id.
Though equity will sometimes give effect to acts not in themselves
binding obligations at law, yet it does so only to reach those who ought to
be made responsible, or who are liable in person or estate to pay a debt.
It will not give relief to a creditor out of the separate estate of the wife,
where the debt was not hers, but that of the husband; and where her
estate only, subject to the lien of the mortgage held by her trustee, was
pledged, the pledgee cannot require her to make good his mortgage out
of the proceeds of the sale of the property, belonging to her trustee under
the mortgage in her favor: Id.
Where the wife was not the debtor, nor personally bound as surety in
the mortgage executed by herself and husband to his creditor, her interest
in the trust mortgage could not be postponed to his claim against them on
the second mortgage; and since she had not parted in law or equity with
the mortgage held in trust for her, it was entitled as the first mortgage to
be paid in preference to any subsequent liens: Id.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
1
.Municipal Corporations-Power over Streets and Sidewalks-Liabilty
for injuries caused by defects in Sidewalks.-There is a distinction be-
tween the power of municipal corporations over *the carriage ways of their
streets, and that which they possess over sidewalks: Hart and Wife vs.
City of Brooklyn.
The absolute authority over the roadway, conferred upon the Common
Council by the charter of the city of Brooklyn, is not possessed by them
over the sidewalks; and the same responsibility cannot be imposed, for
the condition of the sidewalks, as for that of the roadway: Id.
A municipal corporation is not liable in damages, to an individual, for
injuries caused by an opening in a si~dewalk, made by an owner of the soil
or the adjacent land, without proof of notice of the insufficiency or defect,
and neglect to cause it to be remedied: id.
The public authorities are not to be presumed to have notice of a latent
defect in the covering of an opening in the sidewalk, which was not made
by them or under their direction: Id.
.Notice to the public authorities of defects or obstructions in the streets,
not occasioned by their own acts, must be express, or the defects must be
so notorious as to be evident to all who have occasion to pass the place or
to observe the premises: Id.
.dction for Personal Injuries-Negligence of the Plaintiff.-No matter
how gross or evident may be the negligence of the driver of a vehicle, if
another by his own negligence exposes himself to injury from the vehicle,
he has no remedy: Mangam vs. Brooklyn City Railroad Company.
Knowingly to allow a child of less than four years of age to go at large
in a public street without a protector, is such negligence in his parents
or guardians as will, if unexplained, prevent a recovery by him for a
personal injury: Id.
Although want of care cannot be imputed to a child, for not avoiding a
passing vehicle, it may be charged upon those who have the care of the
child, if they suffer him to go unprotected where vehicles are passing,
and where care and forethought must be required, beyond what he is
capable of exercising: Id.
If the child has parents living, and he is under their charge and
1 From the Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter of the Court.
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protection, he is responsible for their acts and omissions, as if they were
his own; and for the purposes of an action by him for personal injuries,
their negligence must be regarded as his negligence: Id.
J7urisdiction- Costs.-A court possesses power and jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether it has authority to entertain a particular controversy,
although its decision and the law be, that it has no such authority, and it
therefore dismisses the writ. Such a question may b& presented, by
demurrer, and its decision must be a judgment: .King vs. Poole.
Accordingly, where A. brought an action against B. in the county
court, and B. demurred on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, and the court rendered a decision sustaining the
demurrer: Beld, that the court had power to enter a judgment dismissing
the complaint or writ, and awarding costs to the defendant: Id.
Costs are a proper and necessary incident of such a judgment, and the
court can no more deny them to a defendant who succeeds in establishing
upon an issue of law, that the court has not jurisdiction, than to a
plaintiff who has shown that it has: Id.
Assignability of Cause of Action-Principal and Agent.-A cause of
action for the conversion by the defendant of funds intrusted to him as
an agent, for which he has not accounted to his principal, is assignable.
Gould vs. Gould.
Where an agent has duties to perform towards h'is principal, in the
nature of a trust, he falls within the suspected relation, and the law
indulges the presumption of fraud against a release procured by him from
his principal, altkough no fraud is visible to the eye of the court: Id.
One cannot act for himself as vendor, and as agent for another as
purqhaser, in transferring securities: Id.
Vendor and Purchaser of Chattels; Rescinding Sale.-A vendor who
has sold goods and drawn bills upon the purchaser for the price, can
rescind the sale and sue for the value of the goods, if he has good cause
for doing so, notwithstanding the bills, at the time of commencing the
action, are out of his possession, so that he cannot then surrender them.
If he produces the paper at the trial, and then offers to surrender it or
cancel the acceptances, that is sufficient: .raschieris vs. .enriques.
Partnership; Note by Firm to a Partner-Action thereon by Idorsee.-
Where a promissory note, made by a partnership firm to one of its
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members, for money advanced by him to the firm, is indorsed by the
payee to another after maturity, the holder may maintain an action thereon
against the makers: Sherwood vs. Barton.
Bonds issued by Railroad Companies payable in Blank; Action by
Assignee.-Where a bond for the payment of money is issued by a
railroad company, payable to- or assigns, any lawful holder by
delivery or transfer may insert his own name in the blank as the payee,
and maintain an action thereon: .Hubbard vs. New York and Harlem
Railroad Company.
Principal and Agent.-The plaintiff and defendant being owners of
adjoining lots, the latter built a wall upon his lot along the boundary-line
between them, the same being constructed for him by D. & C., under
a written contract. The defendant furnished the materials only, but
employed no workmen and exercised no control over them: Held, that he
was not liable to the plaintiff for damages caused by the blowing down
of the wall before it was completed; the relation of master and servant, or
principal and agent, not existing between the defendant and those by
whom the wall was constructed: Benedict vs. fartin.
Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors-Estoppel.-A provision in an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, directing the payment of a
fictitious demand to the assignor's wife, renders the assignment void, as
intended to hinder and delay creditors: American Exchange Bank vs.
Webb.
Where a wife, thus provided for in an assignment executed by her
husband, delivered a release of her dower in his real estate, upon condition
that if the assignment should be held valid, she should receive the amount
directed to be paid to her by the assignment, and if held invalid, that she
should have her dower out of the proceeds, and the plaintiff, a creditor,
assented to these terms, and to a sale of the property in accordance
therewith: Held, that this did not amount to a ratification of the assign-
ment by him, or estop him from attacking it as fraudulent and void, and
having the same set aside: rd.
Discharge of Indorser; Nezq Security; Extending Time of Payment.-
The receipt of a bill or note having time to run, from the party primarily
liable on a bill or note then overdue, will not operate to discharge an
indorser on the bill or note so overdue, unless there is an agreement,
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express or implied, that the new bill or draft shall be in payment of thd
former, or extending the time of payment in favor of some party who ip
liable thereon, prior to such indorser: Taylor vs. Allen.
If a new draft is taken by the holder of a protested not, as collateral
to such note, this will not prevent him from enforcing payment of the
note : Id.
And if there is some evidence that a draft was thus taken, the question
should be submitted to the jury whether there was an' agreement to
extend the time of payment on the protested note, or whether the new
was given and received as collateral to the old security: Id.
Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors.-A trust in an assignment to
pay the legal and necessary expenses of the assignees, with a salary of
$2000 a year to each, if that did not exceed the allowance made by law to
executors; and if it should exceed that amount, then at the rate so
prescribed for executors, will not render the assignment illegal: .Ketelters
vs. Wilson et a.
A trust, requiring the assignees to pay all persons who had become
bail or surety for the assignors, the amount of their payments or liabilitiez
as such, is not illegal: Id.
Yet where the assignors gave a preference in favor of bail and sureties,
for the declared object of effecting a delay of several years, by the opera-
tion of this clause, knowing that the clause would produce that effect,
and with the intent of putting off creditors, and gaining time to com-
promise with them: Held, that the assignment was void as against such
creditors. Id. .
Dower; Provision by Will, when in Lieu of.-A testator, by his will,
gave to his wife certain articles of personal property and one-third of'the
net income of all his real estate, after payment of all taxes, assessments,
and interest due thereon, during her natural life. Upon her death the
payments were to cease, and the said one-third of the net income was to
go to the heirs. The provisions were not stated to be in lieu of dower:
Held, that the widow was not put to her election: Tobias vs. Ketchum.
What is a Promissory Note?-An instrument by which the maker
promises to pay to'the order of another a specified sum, at the store of
the former-or in goods, on demand, for value received, is a negotiable
promissory note: Hosstatter vs. Wilson.
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Assignment for Benefit of Creditors-Agreements between Debtor and
Creditor.-Where creditors of an insolvent firm entered into an agreement
with the latter, by which they covenanted that in case the debtors would
execute an assignment of their property to S., preferring therein, as first
class creditors, an amount not exceeding $60,000, and preferring the
covenantors to the amount of fifty cents on the dollar on their several
claims, they would discharge the debtors from all liability for the balance
of such claims; and such assignment was accordingly executed; ield,
that the agreement and assignment were to be construed as constituting
parts of one and the same transaction; and that the assignment was on
its face fraudulent and void: Spaulding vs. Strang et al.
An insolvent debtor cannot do, by concealment, what he may not do
openly. Hence, he cannot, by a secret bargain with a portion of his
creditors, compel them to agree to his release on condition of his execut-
ing an assignment giving them preferences: Id.
Lex loci and Lex fori-Statute of Limitations.-The rule as to con-
tracts is that the lex loci contractus governs, as to the nature, validity,
construction, and effect of the contract, and the lexfori as to the remedy:
Gans et al. vs. Frank et al.
The application of this rule will dispose of any defence arising upon a
statute of limitations of a foreign state, where such statute only prohibits
the bringing of an action after the time limited in such state. The statute
has no effect out of the state, and is not violated by bringing an action in
another state or country: Id.
Where the defendant passed through this state more than six years
before the commencement of the action, but was only here temporarily,
and all the defendants had resided in Pennsylvania since the cause of
action accrued; Held, that the action was not barred by our statute of
limitations : Id.
If a debtor comes into this state before process is served on him, and
he then leaves the state to reside elsewhere, the statute is not a bar until,,
after deducting all the time of residing abroad, the debtor has been in
this state for six years: .d.
Whether the absence is repeated, or is one continued absence, is imma-
terial. There must be full six'years spent in this state to make our statute
of limitations a bar: Id.
Principal and Agent.-Under ordinary circumstances, an authority
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given by a partnership firm to its agent, to advance moneys for the pur-
chase of notes or bills to be remitted to the firm, will not justify the agent
in continuing to make such advances, after being notified of a change in
the firm by the admission of new members. There must. be a renewed
authorization by the new firm: Catlanan vs. Van Fleck.
But if the bills so purchased by the agent, after notice of the change in
the firm, have been remitted to the firm, received and retained by the new
members, and used and applied in their business, this will justify the agent
in inferring that the authority previously given by the old firm was con-
tinued by the consent of the new one; and is sufficient to render the new
firm liable for the amount of such advances: Id.
Banks; power and authority of Cashiers.-The cashier of a bank has
no power to make a contract for the bank in his own name, unless the cor-
poration has authorized him to do so on its behalf, and with the intention
that it should be bound; Bank of the State of New York vs. The Farmers'
Branch of the State Bank of Ohio.
Accordingly, where a cashier, though authorized to indorse, for the
purpose of transmitting to other banks for collection, bills and notes depo-
sited with his bank or discounted by it, had no special authority to affix his
name, or that of the bank, for the purpose of making the corporation
liable on a contract of indorsement, but in order to facilitate the collection
of a bill he indorsed the same as follows :" Pay E. Ludlow, Cas., or order,
P. S. Campbell, Cas. :" Reid, that the bank was not made liable as indorser
of the bill: Id.
Life Insurance.-One having an interest in the continuance of the life
of another, as his creditor, may insure the life of the debtor, and the con-
tract for that purpose will be valid: Rawls vs. The American Life Insur-
ance Company.
The fact that the debt is due to the creditor as a member of a partner-
ship, and from another firm of which the person whose life is insured is a
member, does not alter the rule: Id.
If such a policy of insurance is valid in its inception, the circumstance
that the statute of limitations had run against the debt, before the occur-
rence of the death, will not affect it: Id.
It is not necessary that the party holding a policy on the life of another
should have an insurable interest in such life, at the time of the death, to
make the policy valid, if it was valid in its inception: Id.
